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PERVASIVE, INTERNALISED VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA:
Reflections on Causation and Future Trajectory
Background
1. In South Africa the 1993 level of murders exceeds 20,000 - when 
complete - probably 22,500. Given a fairly high level of non­
reporting this suggests a total of 27,500. For comparison the USA 
total (a relatively violent society with fuller reporting and seven 
times the population) is about 50,000.
There is no reason to suppose that levels of non-life destroying 
violence are less unusually high. Anecdotal evidence suggests they 
are.
2. The standard assumption is that a high percent of the deaths are 
directly related to political violence and therefore to the apartheid 
system. The implication of this empirico/causal explanation is that 
the ending of apartheid/installation of legitimate government 
could/logically should lead to a rapid fall in murder/violence rates.
3. Unfortunately, the estimates of 1993 directly political violence 
related deaths range between 3,000 and 4,000. The balance of 'non­
political1 murders of 23,500 to 24,500 remains extremely high for a 
population of 40 million odd.
4. The non (non-directly) political deaths are apparently not unusual in
distribution: domestic violence, fighting while inebriated and 
killing in the course of robbery and during or after rape. The same 
seem to hold for non-lethal violence. The distinguishing 
characteristic is the numbers. Those suggest that violence is a 
first resort and lethal violence is widely perceived, if not 
precisely as acceptable, as a matter of fact, normal action by an 
unusually high proportion of the population (even if unusually high 
may be as low as 5% to 10% of adults).
2Causal Contributions
5. To give apartheid as a one word answer to "Why?" is inadequate 
(especially if "Why?" is to be followed by "What is to be done?") and 
also inaccurate.
6. Political murders are caused primarily by apartheid. The context of
oppression, degradation, lack of elections and attempts to insulate 
areas from state forces and their (real or supposed) servants and 
informers is one leading directly to mayhem.
7. However, while apartheid may be the cause of political murders in 
Natal there are deeper historic roots for what might be termed "Zulu 
against Zulu" violence; roots which go back to Kings Cetswayo and 
Shaka. The majority of Zulu speaking people south of the Buffalo 
River are the descendants of refugees from the rise of Shaka's 
kingdom and, to a lesser extent, from losing factions within the 
kingdom. They are linguistically and culturally Zulu but not 
naturally supporters of a movement using the symbols of the Zulu 
kingdom and led by a descendant of Cetswayo's prime minister. North 
of the Buffalo the patterns of conflict echo the cleavages that arose 
out of Garnet Wolsey's attempt to create a series of statelets in 
Zululand with primarily anti-Cetswayo heads; the breakdown of that 
system; the abortive second coming of Cetswayo and the wars leading 
to the final conquest. Where an anti-Cetswayo statelets' kinglet 
built up a base and resisted the restoration of Cetswayo, there today 
tends to be violent resistance to the imposition of an Inkatha 
monopoly of power (e.g. Eshowe - the old fief of 'Paramount Chief' 
John Dunne).
8. The non-political murders do, in a sense, flow from apartheid but in
a different and more complex way:
a. Extreme poverty often breeds crime and extreme poverty combined 
with extreme inequality almost always does;
b. extreme degradation often is reacted against, with violence;
c. perceived illegitimacy of state, many laws, the legal system 
forecloses respect for law and order even in respect to areas 
outside apartheid; and
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d. also forecloses normal remedies for discontents, forcing the 
aggrieved to fall back on "self help" measures which are likely 
to involve violence;
e. the foregoing create an atmosphere in which some forms of 
violence (including lethal violence) come to be tolerated or even 
approved and
f. all of the foregoing create a sea of violence in which perfectly 
'normal', apolitical criminals can swim relatively unseen.
It is relevant to note that Brazil - in a number of respects the 
country most parallel to South African in both economic 
structures/policy and in the pervasiveness of entrenched (albeit not 
statutory) racism - also has one of the world's highest murder rates.
The combination of factors is important. Extreme poverty alone does 
not lead to high murder rates vide Maputo and Dar es Salaam. Nor do 
high levels of robbery (which characterise Dar es Salaam albeit not 
Maputo) necessarily lead to high levels of robbery associated 
violence, let alone lethal violence. The outcomes, in fact vary 
widely among Dar es Salaam, Accra, Lusaka, Nairobi and Lagos (low to 
very high) for reasons which appear to relate to specific 
interactions within urban micro cultures. The presence of a 
substantial European ancestry minority does not have a uniform 
influence: neither Maputo, Windhoek nor Gaborone are violent in 
comparative terms whereas Lagos and (even before the 1965- ???? 
political violence sequence) Kampala/Mengo are.
None of this denies the causal role of apartheid in creating the 
factors leading to the present climate of violence. It may however, 
raise doubts as to how far and how fast the introduction of a 
legitimate constitutional order/government will erode it.
Legitimate Government?
"After apartheid" is not a relevant term in that the socio-political 
and political-economic consequences of apartheid will remain plainly 
visible for decades. After the achievement of legitimate government 
is a more relevant short term (assuming 1994 constitutional 
settlement/elections) one.
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What then:
a. the government will be legitimate as overtly perceived (but 
perhaps with that view incompletely internalised);
b. the same may be true of the judicial system and of laws;
c. but it is very uncertain whether the police will be perceived as 
legitimate unless there are massive changes in attitudes, 
priorities and personnel (in which context it is not entirely 
whimsical to suggest that the ANC's military wing might better be 
integrated into the police than into the army. It is the police 
who need to relate to black people on a basis of trust day by 
day) ;
d. a factor enhanced by the probability (judging from Zimbabwean and 
Namibian experience) many white officers will 'keep their heads 
down' and do next to nothing. That may avoid provoking riots but 
is hardly functional to reducing background levels of violence;
e. there will be a substantial body of township "comrades” who 
perceive themselves as having been in the vanguard of the 
1980s/90s struggle but have little education, no work experience, 
no real integration into any political grouping, are virtually 
unemployable and therefore are exceedingly bitter because to them 
the new order seems a betrayal and a continuation of their 
exclusion;
f. the first electoral exercise will have been marked by violence
(especially in Natal and townships) so that no clean break
between violent and electoral struggle phases is (or could be)
perceived.
That is not a background that can lead to great optimism as to easy 
reduction of violence levels even in respect to political violence 
proper. It is relevant to note that in a context of poverty and 
deprivation contrasting with nearby affluence even in systems with a 
record of competitive, multi party election political violence can 
become entrenched and very difficult to reduce (vide Jamaica).
515. The elements cited in Par 13 also suggest that quasi political 
violence - against public service workers and facilities (not limited 
to police) employees as symbols of rejected authority - is likely to 
remain high. Because there is by now no tradition of expecting to 
receive services and to pay rates and charges the new, legitimate 
local governmental bodies' staff (especially but not only collectors 
and disconnectors) will be at risk even if Civics launch a massive 
education campaign on their behalf and service providers are 
imaginative in trying to relate to clients (as Escom on occasion has 
become).
16. In respect to generalised violence several factors will pertain:
a. many people will remain poor;
b. the fragmented, frequently combatative and often far from 
inclusive nature of community self-organisation will remain at 
least in part;
c. the habit of bowing to coercion and - especially - not going to 
the police for protection or redress will not easily be reversed;
d. there will be large numbers of illicit, cheap firearms;
e. economic group battles (e.g. taxi wars) are likely to prove very 
difficult to contain and to channel into mediation processes;
f. the habit (Weltanschauung? One hesitates to say culture) of 
speedy resort to violence economically, domestically, in inter 
personal relations now that it appears to be deeply internalised 
by many persons will not fade away as legitimate governmental 
structures appear;
g. hope for a better life and of an end to marginalisation socially 
and economically will be in short supply - possibly even more so 
than today once the limits of possible speedy change become 
evident, in some cases brutally contradicting unattainable 
expectations of what "Amandla" can mean for day to day or year to 
year life.
617. That suggests that there is little reason to expect a rapid decrease 
(or perhaps any decrease at all?) in levels of non-political 
(indirectly political) violence. That is likely to be especially 
true if the police remain distrusted, inadequately trained for new 
roles and with many holdover force members (especially, but not only,
white ones) keeping their heads well down.
What Might Be Done?
18. The preceding vista is not a pretty one - rather it is an appalling 
one. To say it is dominantly the heritage of apartheid is valid but 
operationally less than helpful.
19. The costs of inaction or unsuccessful action will be high. That is
above all a moral and a human consideration. But it is also a matter
of effective governance and provision of services, of morale to work 
hard (another victim of apartheid), of budgetary constraint (high 
levels of violence do require high police-court-prison expenditure) 
and of general economic coBt raising/animal spirits lowering/investor 
and customer discouraging (the extreme case being tourism).
20. A number of steps might help:
a. a general macro economic strategy making poverty reduction and 
livelihood expansion central;
b. a land and rural reform strategy making acceptable rural 
household livelihoods available to a high proportion of present 
rural residents to avert waves of refugees from rural into urban 
deprivation;
c. high priority to occupationally oriented adult education 
specifically designed for 16 to 30 year old township/settlement 
residents who are now virtually uneducated and unemployable which 
is directly related to the livelihood expansion strategy to 
ensure that it is not education for continued unemployment;
d. urban labour intensive public works, maintenance, construction 
foci (on projects which need to be done anyhow - the point is 
reallocation from capital to labour intensive approaches not 
devising "backyard pagoda" schemes, e.g. basic drainage and
7sidewalks in township and 'squatter' resettlement areas not 
'flowerbeds everywhere') to reduce the structural labour force 
entrants/expansion of livelihoods imbalance;
e. concentration on incorporating US (ANC army) cadres primarily 
into the police rather than the army because it is the former who 
must have good day to day, face to face relations with poor black 
South Africans based on mutual trust and perceived legitimacy. 
(The primary victims of violence - and potentially the force 
which can contain and reduce it most and most rapidly - are non­
violent, poor, township and squatter area dwellers);
f. building up broadly based, multiple community structures which do 
mediate to provide alternatives to violence for dispute 
resolution backed by official structures analogous to the Peace 
Commissions/Goldstone Commission;
g. providing effective protection for citizens who report violence 
to, bear witness in court cases involving violence so that fear 
of personal consequences will not be/become as effective a 
barrier to cooperation with police/courts in the future as their 
perceived illegitimacy is now;
h. broadening the access to official safety nets (including but not 
limited to, strengthening the old age and disability pension 
structures) and facilitating (including by grants) civil society 
ones by community based bodies (including religious 
congregations, trade union branches, local women's organisations) 
to reduce destitution. Even if elimination of severe poverty by 
this route is not possible until both livelihoods expansion 
(reducing demand) and fiscal as well as production growth 
(increasing allocable resource) have 'taken off' very substantial 
reduction of destitution and hopeless misery could be achieved.
21. Most of these items are on the policy exploration agenda now for
reasons other than violence reduction. What may not be being done is 
to consider their potential for violence reduction and their possible 
re-articulation (not necessarily requiring more scarce resources) 
jointly and in the context of a specific strategic focus on violence
8reduction. However, c-e-f-g do not appear to have attracted 
substantial attention.
22. The additional cost of action on the foregoing fronts could be guite 
low. The expenditures on a-b-d-h (which would dominate total costs) 
are desired/prioritised for other reasons - the issue is one of re­
allocating in detailed articulation rather than of spending more 
money. Of the other measures only c (targeted adult education) would 
have a high price tag (incorporating ANC military cadres into the 
police rather than the army would not raise total military/police 
costs). The costs of inaction could be very substantially higher.
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